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When Do Chinese National Ministries Make Law?
Wei Cui, Peter A. Allard School of Law,
University of British Columbia
(October 10, 2019 draft)i

Abstract: This paper documents some basic empirical facts about the issuance of formal regulations
(FRs) and informal policy directives (IPDs) by China’s national ministries and agencies from 2000 to 2014.
Prior scholarship (e.g. Cui 2011, Howson 2012) depicts specific instances of Chinese national agencies
announcing substantive new policies (many ultra vires by statutory standards) through IPDs. I use FR
and IPD quantities as measures of the agencies’ propensity to resort to legal as opposed to non-legal,
merely bureaucratic mechanisms for announcing policy. I find significant variations across agencies in
the quantities of FRs issued, both in absolute terms and relative to the quantities of IPDs. The variations
often contradict conventional perceptions about different agencies’ political orientations. Budget
fluctuations do not predict FR or IPD issuance, nor do the minister’s tenure in office. Overall, formal
rulemaking has been on the decline in China, accentuating the importance of the question: Why do
Chinese bureaucrats bother with rulemaking at all? I suggest a preliminary set of considerations relevant
to answering this question. The study sheds new light on the different approaches taken by actors in the
Chinese government to establishing basic “rule by law”.
Keywords: Chinese law, rule by law, rule of law, rulemaking, informal policy documents, national
ministries.

Introduction
Perhaps the most ubiquitous distinction in recent scholarship on Chinese law is drawn between
“rule by law” and the “rule of law”. While individual usages differ, “rule by law” typically denotes an
approach to governance that uses instruments and mechanisms that can be described as constituting a
“legal system”, but which can essentially be tailored to the preferences of autocrats and used in state
oppression, with disregard for citizens’ rights. Many refer to the same concept also by the term “thin”
rule of law. Both terms are contrasted with the concept of “rule of law”, which reflects a deeper respect
for due process and individual rights, and possibly additional norms associated with Western democratic
institutions. Increasingly, scholars have come to assume that the Chinese government has embraced
“rule by law” (in the mode of, say, Singapore), and focus their attention on the contrast between such a
mode of “authoritarian legality” and the rule of law as traditionally understood in the West.
I believe this widespread assumption is mistaken. “Rule by law” may be what the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) claims to want to implement, but does not accurately characterize many
fundamental aspects of the Chinese state’s operation. The reach of legal institutions and processes in
China—i.e. the presence of rule by law or “thin” rule of law—has been substantially overestimated in
recent scholarship. Arguably, in taking the existence of basic legal ordering in China for granted,
i
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scholars—even those who believe themselves to be highly critical of the Chinese government—have
uncritically accepted much CCP discourse. This creates an intellectual conundrum; it does not seem
conceptually possible to have the (thick) “rule of law” without the “thin” rule of law or rule by law. The
focus on the distinction between the two seems unjustified when both are absent from Chinese
governance.
Among the relatively few scholars who have commented on the fragility of even the “thin” rule
of law in China is Professor Nico Howson. In his 2012 article “Enforcement without Foundation”,1
Professor Howson identifies a 2007 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) internal policy
document on insider trading that is ultra vires relative to statutory provisions, patently invalid by
Chinese administrative law standards, but that was nonetheless routinely enforced by CSRC and widely
tolerated by affected investors in China’s capital markets. Professor Howson marvels at how “China's
most ‘modern’, politically independent and technically competent regulator” could decide to impose
such an egregiously defective rule, all with remarkably little resistance, “upon relatively sophisticated,
well-educated, largely urban, property rights-wielding investors.” This seems especially surprising when
“the regulated transactions are economic and financial, not political or oppositional in nature.” Such
phenomena, he argues, “provide important insights regarding China's efforts to establish even thin ‘rule
of law’ after more than three decades,” because they are emblematic of “a much larger dysfunction that
exists in many other areas of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s applied legal and administrative law
system.”2
Professor Howson conjectures that “the problem [that] appears under the administration of the
CSRC…exist[s] even more in the approaches taken by older-line agencies and departments.” In this
chapter, I test Professor Howson’s conjecture through a simple empirical exercise: I examine the
promulgation of formal regulations (FRs) and publication of informal policy directives (IPDs) by all of
China’s national ministries and agencies during the 2000-2013 period. Using the quantities of FRs and
IPDs as a measure of agencies’ propensity to utilize legal as opposed to non-legal, merely bureaucratic
policy instruments, I highlight some surprising patterns in the different approaches taken by a large
range of actors in China’s central government to establishing basic “rule by law”.
I find very significant variations in the quantities of formal regulations (which are genuine legal
instruments) issued by different agencies, both in absolute number and relative to the quantities of IPDs
published by the same agencies. These variations often contradict conventional perceptions about the
political orientation of different agencies. For example, the Ministry of Public Security, an integral part of
China’s machinery for state oppression that perhaps few would assume pursues the legitimacy of law,
adopts formal regulations with greater relative frequency than most other ministries. Other patterns
that emerge from the empirical analysis similarly lack ready explanations that can be drawn from the
existing literature. I offer some preliminary hypotheses about how the patterns I identify may be
explained. But the more general point is that the Chinese political class may have very limited incentives
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to pursue even “rule by law”, and that instead of taking the growth of legal ordering for granted, it is
more appropriate to ask the question: Why do Chinese politicians bother with law at all?
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides basic background on China’s national level
agencies and the distinction between formal regulations and informal policy directives. In particular, I
draw a sharper distinction between what is law and what is not law in the Chinese system than
Professor Howson does, and elaborate on why doing so is justified. Section 2 sets out certain basic
patterns in agency rulemaking. Section 3 discusses potential explanations of the patterns identified in
Section 2, and presents further related empirical analyses. Section 4 sets out a preliminary framework
for understanding Chinese politicians’ incentives for lawmaking and discusses some implications of the
chapter’s empirical findings.

1. Can Ministries Make Law other than Regulations?
I propose to assess Chinese national government agencies’ propensity to establish “rule by law”
by measuring their frequency of issuing formal regulations (bumen guizhang) relative to their issuance
of informal policy directives. Since the enactment of the Law on Legislation (LL) in 2000, clear
procedures have generally governed the adoption and publication of ministry/agency regulations. A
ministry regulation is always issued as a decree (ling) in the name of the minister, and is published with
consecutive numbering. Consistent with the principle that law must be published to take effect, it is rare
for a ministry regulation associated with a known decree number to not be locatable. By contrast,
Chinese executive branch agencies issue a wide variety of bureaucratic documents, and there is no
uniform format for those documents intended to have policy significance, and no guarantee that those
documents with policy significance would be publicly available.
Take the CSRC for example. The 2007 insider trading guidance that Professor Howson criticizes
has the document numbering “zhengjian jicha zi (2007) No. 1”. In the same year, the CSRC issued 13
regulations by itself (CSRC Decrees no. 40 to 52) and 4 joint regulations with other ministries. As of July
2019, Chinalawinfo also lists 62 CSRC ministry policy documents (bumen guifanxing wenjian) from 2007,
along with 626 CSRC “ministry work documents” (bumen gongzuo wenjian) and 1,042 CSRC decisions
made with respect to individual persons from the same year. While the insider trading guidance is
classified by Chinalawinfo as a policy document, no other document in the jicha zi series is available for
2007. This could be either because there was no further document in the series,3 or because further
documents in the series were not released to the public. Moreover, given that the jicha zi series
concerns audits, one might have expected documents in the series to relate to the enforcement of
already-announced policies, instead of announcing policies for the first time. In other words,
Chinalawinfo’s classification of the guidance as a CSRC policy document did not have any particular legal
basis; it seems that the guidance could easily have been treated as a “work document” (a category of
Chinalawinfo’s own creation).4
The difficulty of identifying bureaucratic documents that are not formal regulations and are
intended to be generally complied with is much more pervasive than the single example of the insider
trading guidance might suggest. For instance, in 2007 the CSRC appears to have issued at least 144
3
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4
Professor Howson argued against viewing the insider trading guidance as guifanxing wenjian. Howson, supra note
1, at 979-80.
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circulars (zhengjianfa) in its own name. As of 2019, only ten of these are available as policy documents
on Chinalawinfo; seven others are available as work documents (and none as individual decisions),
leaving most documents in the zhengjianfa series unaccounted for. The CSRC also issues other
documents on behalf of its various divisions, e.g. the jigouzi series for the Institutional Division, the
faxingzi series for the Listing Division, and so on. Plenty of documents in each of the multiple series
remain unpublished. The published documents in each series are used variously for announcing policies,
organizing bureaucratic matters within the agency, or rendering individual decisions. There is generally
neither a legal nor institutional basis for knowing which documents are intended to promulgate policy.5
Finally, it should be noted that in the last decade, the CSRC appears to increasingly issue policy
documents in the consecutively-numbered bulletin (gonggao) format. This practice bears some
similarity to the practices of a few other national agencies (e.g. the State Administration of Taxation or
SAT6) that aim to improve the procedure for agency policy adoption outside formal rulemaking, and to
make it easier for the public to follow policy announcements. However, it remains unclear whether the
CSRC currently issues major policy announcements only through bulletins, and if not, what other
methods exist to identify such announcements.
In summary, if we stipulate that guifanxing wenjian—which I translate in the remainder of this
chapter as “informal policy directives” (IPDs)—refer to government documents that are not formal
regulations but that nonetheless announce policies intended to be generally followed by the public,
then what is an IPD at the CSRC remains unclear to this day. To our knowledge, this ambiguity applies to
virtually all Chinese executive branch entities, at national and subnational levels. Indeed, few agencies
have adopted the CSRC and SAT practices of identifying IPDs through a specific document format (e.g. a
consecutively-numbered bulletin).
I believe that these observations imply, at a basic conceptual level, that IPDs issued by Chinese
government agencies should not be viewed as generating legal norms. Stated in legal theoretical terms,
legal norms come into being only when there are accepted “rules of recognition”—used by either
government officials, or the public to whom legal norms apply, or both—to identify which rules are
legally valid.7 Legal norms must display certain “attributes of legality,” so that it is possible for it to
become common knowledge in the relevant community which norms embody the demands of law.8 The
example of the CSRC shows that when one puts ministry regulations (and higher norms such as national
statutes) aside, Chinese national agencies have not offered alternative mechanisms for identifying
sources of norms that civil servants and citizens must comply with and enforce. Therefore, in a nonlegalistic sense that should be recognizable in diverse legal systems, Chinese ministry IPDs do not
constitute “law”.9
5
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(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2013).
8
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This conclusion is—or at least would have been until recently—even more straightforward when
analyzed in Chinese legal terms. The Law on Legislation (LL) prescribes clear norms and procedures for
enacting law (including executive branch regulations) and does not contemplate any source of generally
applicable norms in the Chinese legal system aside from those stated in its scope. The LL arguably offers
the most salient set of “rules of recognition” within the Chinese legal system, which rules command
wide compliance among government officials.10 There is no comparable set of alternative rules of
recognition anywhere else in the Chinese legal system. This set of rules of recognition was also until
recently clearly upheld by the judicial system. Under the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), Chinese
judges must refer to (canzhao) ministry regulations as sources of law and must apply them if they are
not in conflict with higher legal norms. On the other hand, at least prior to 2018, Chinese judges could
choose to apply or disregard IPDs at their discretion.11
The recent change to the “rules of recognition” in the Chinese legal system just alluded to does
not affect Professor Howson’s 2007 CSRC example nor the empirical analysis below; it is a change that is
still unknown to much of the world. Since 2015, when the ALL was amended, plaintiffs suing
government agencies in China have been entitled to request courts to pass judgements on the legal
validity of any IPDs that defendant agencies purport to be the basis of their actions. I have argued
elsewhere that this measure for judicial review of IPDs, which would ostensibly empower plaintiffs, is
not only largely unnecessary but also will likely prove counterproductive. This is because of the glaring
ambiguity as to how much China’s civil law judiciary can compel agencies in the executive branch to
explicitly revise or withdraw their IPDs. Moreover, in 2018, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued an
interpretation of the amended ALL, which instructed judges to give IPDs legal effect whenever they are
determined to not contravene higher legal norms. In other words, whereas the previous standard of
judicial review of IPDs is that IPDs may be given effect if judges deem them to be reasonable and not
ultra vires (or otherwise invalid), the new standard is that IPDs must be given legal effect if they are not
invalid (even if unreasonable).
This seems to amount to a requirement of greater judicial deference to the executive than
under the previous status quo. It further implies that IPDs may be regarded as a source of legal norms,
as long as they are not patently illegal. This is because executive branch agencies can now argue that, in
the absence of patent illegality, their IPDs would always be given effect by courts per the SPC’s
instruction. It remains to be seen how the SPC’s new ALL interpretation will be followed. It does not
resolve the question of how to identify IPDs generally, since the vast majority of IPDs will not be
litigated. However, it does threaten to introduce a new path to “legality” for IPDS completely alien to
the Law on Legislation.
In any case, I study the practices of national ministries in adopting formal regulations and issuing
IPDs in an earlier period, during which FRs, based on the foregoing arguments, were the only forms of
law promulgated by ministries.12 The issuance of FRs and IPDs by national ministries put an important
10

That is, few Chinese government officials, and least of all government lawyers and judges, would fail to
distinguish between regulations and IPDs, even though many laypersons and legal scholars do.
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Cui, supra note 6; Wei Cui, Jie Cheng and Dominika Weisner, “Judicial Review of Government Actions,” China
Perspectives 1 (2019): 29.
12
I do not analyze the State Council’s promulgation of formal regulations and IPDs, since the unique status of the
State Council makes it hard to compare with other executive branch entities.
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bound on the overall supply of rules and policies in China. Although provincial and sub-provincial
governments also issue FRs and IPDs,13 they face numerous constraints in and disincentives for doing so
(particularly the veto or disapproval of higher-level policymakers). National-level rulemaking, by
contrast, faces the lowest risk of interference by other principals, while also benefitting the most from
economies of scale. Therefore, for any regulatory issue for which a nationally consistent set of rules is
feasible, the adoption of such rules by the national government is the most desirable.14
During the period I study, Chinese national ministries were officially divided into six types:15
(A) 25 cabinet ministries;
(B) 16 agencies directly affiliated with the State Council, 9 of which are full ministry-level
agencies;16
(C) 13 “non-administrative” agencies directly affiliated with the State Council, three of which—
agencies regulating banking, insurance, and securities—perform functions important to the
administrative state (notwithstanding their classification);17
(D) 16 national bureaus reporting to other national agencies, all of which are ranked one tier
lower than agencies in categories (A) to (C), though some of them also play important
regulatory functions;
(E) 4 clerical offices of the State Council; and
(F) 30 temporary inter-agency coordination offices.
In 2015 and 2016, I gathered FR and IPD data for most agencies within groups (A) to (D) except
for the non-regulatory agencies in category (C).18 I have ignored agencies in groups (E) to (F). A table of
ministries/agencies, as well as information regarding data on additional ministry-level variables used in
the analyses below, are given in Table A.1 in the (online) Appendix.

2. Overview of Ministry Regulations and IPD Issuance, 2000-2014
Figure 1 depicts the overall trends in ministry regulation-making and IPD release. The dramatic
rise in the volume of publicly available IPDs is not surprising; open government information initiatives
individually pursued by various ministries prior to 2008, and made mandatory by the State Council in
2008, are likely responsible for the increases of IPDs in the public domain. Perhaps more remarkable is
the decline in formal rulemaking since the mid-2000s; collectively, Chinese national agencies in recent
years make only about half of the number of regulations that they did in 2004. The ‘per ministry’ mean
of FR issuance is 65 over the fifteen-year period and the median is 54, both converting to around four
13

For a systematic study, see Wei Cui and Jiang Wan, “When Do Chinese Subnational Governments Make Law?”
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3467703.
14
In terms of data, national ministries also enjoy economies of scale in publicizing the rules they adopt, and
therefore any rule that is meant to be published and to be of common knowledge is also most likely to be
published.
15
See http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2005-08/01/content_18608.htm.
16
These tend to be agencies that began as minor agencies but evolved and acquired important status—the
General Administration of Customs, the State Administration of Taxation, and the State Administration for Industry
and Commerce are examples.
17
Others in this group are quite different in character, and include, for example, Xinhua News Agency and the
Academy of Science. I exclude these non-regulatory agencies from the scope of the study.
18
The timing of the data gathering matters for IPDs, as more IPDs are released and included in databases over
time. It does not matter for FRs, since information on FRs is identifiable and invariant from the time of their
issuance.
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regulations per ministry per year. For IPD, the mean and median per year per ministry are 183 and 66,
respectively.

Figure 1: Aggregate FR Adoption and IPD
Release by National Agencies, 2000-2014
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Table 1 ranks ministries by FR adoption during this period and provides the corresponding mean
annual IPD frequency for each ministry.19 Consider first the end of the spectrum characterized by
infrequent regulation making. The ministries of National Defense and of State Security issued not a
single FR over the 15-year period, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued only one. Notably, Defense
also released to the public only two IPDs during the entire period and State Security released 12, while
MFA released on average only seven IPDs per year. One explanation of these striking numbers for these
three large, cabinet-level ministries might be their lack of transparency.20 Supporting this interpretation
is the observation that, while the National Oceans Administration and the (former) National
Administration of Survey and Geography also adopted very few regulations (one and three for the whole
period, respectively), they are more forthcoming in releasing IPDs (averaging respectively 29 and 68 per
year). Specialized jurisdictional scope and smaller regulated populations, rather than secretiveness,
seem the more plausible explanation of the low frequency of rulemaking in these latter ministries.
At the other end of spectrum, characterized by (relatively) high frequencies of regulation
making, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) leads with an average of sixteen regulations a year. It
might be suggested that MOFCOM’s status as the agency most closely associated with China’s accession
19

Omitted for reasons of space are numerous category D agencies that displayed zero FR adoption but either
sizeable or at least not extremely low IPD issuance (total IPD issuance in parentheses): State Post Bureau (153),
National Energy Administration (289), Tobacco Monopoly Administration (346), State Administration of Coal Mine
Safety (721), State Administration of Grain (796), State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine (994), and
State Administration of Cultural Heritage (6,293).
20
Several category D agencies also showed extremely low IPD counts: the State Administration of Science,
Technology and Industry for National Defense, State Bureau of Civil Servants, and State Bureau for Letters and
Calls (each released fewer than two IPDs on average per year). It is reasonable to regard these agencies as
nontransparent as well. They are omitted from Table 1 because of zero FR adoption.
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to the WTO makes it most sensitive to the WTO’s government transparency requirements. For those
tempted by this explanation of MOFCOM’s frequent formal rulemaking,21 it will be disappointing that it
would not work for the other agencies at the top of the chart (the Ministry of Transport, General
Administration of Quality Supervision, Ministry of Agriculture, General Administration of Customs, and
so on). Furthermore, for anyone inclined to explain the CSRC’s relative high rank by the modern outlook
of its staff, the even higher rank of the National Development and Reform Commission should give
pause.
Another way to assess the propensity for formal rulemaking is to look at the frequency of
regulation making relative to IPD issuance. The idea is that if the volume of IPDs is a function of an
agency’s scope of regulatory responsibility, then the FR to IPD ratio would render ministries’ observed
dispositions towards “rule by law” more comparable. This idea is partially validated empirically. Through
single-factor ANOVA analysis I determined that there is no significant difference among agency
categories (A) to (D) in respect of mean annual FRs, nor with respect to the FR to IPD ratio (calculated on
a 14-year aggregate basis). However, with respect to mean number of IPDs issued, category (A) agencies
generated more IPDs than category (B) agencies, which in turn generated more than category (D)
agencies.22 It seems plausible to attribute these differences to the average political status of agencies
among the three groups. The FR to IPD ratio would render the agencies in the different groups more
comparable.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the available data on IPDs is quite noisy for two basic
reasons. First, the volume of IPDs clearly depends on the transparency of the agency; an agency that
lacks transparency will have lower IPD counts than an agency of the same size or importance that is
more transparent. Second, as discussed in Section 1, what constitutes an IPD is unclear, and one must
rely on the judgements of Chinalawinfo’s classifiers (which may change over time) for measuring IPD
quantity. In further analysis discussed in Section 3, budget and staff information are used as alternative
measures of agency size/importance. In the absence of more accurate measures of agency regulatory
responsibility, one can do no more than to exclude some outliers that appear to suffer the above
problems most severely. Specifically, in the ranking below I exclude State Security, Defense, Supervision,
Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Statistics, the Audit Bureau, and the National Civil Aviation Administration
based on their low IPD counts, and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission because of its extremely
high IPD count (probably due to Chinalawinfo’s classification).23
Figure 2 displays the resulting ranking. I emphasize that the aim of the ranking is to highlight
certain patterns of potential interest: for the reasons given above, the ranking cannot be taken as
definitive. The first thing to note is the significant variation across agencies (which is also observed in
terms of the absolute quantities of FRs). Among cabinet ministries, the Ministry of Transport has an FR
to IPD ratio ten times as high as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance. Among ministrylevel bureaus, Industry and Commerce has an FR to IPD ratio six times higher than the State
Administration of Taxation. Second, even after omitting many zero or near zero FR adopters, the median
FR to IPD ratio (instantiated by the NDRC) is relatively low, with 40 IPDs for each FR. Third, the ranking is,
I would suggest, not easy to rationalize based on conventional wisdom. For instance, the Chinese police

21

Anecdotes also suggest that MOFCOM has the largest legal department among all national-level agencies.
I leave out category (C) agencies in the ANOVA analysis because the only agencies in this group I examine are the
three financial regulators, and the CIRC is a clear outlier in IPD output.
23
Further, all category D agencies with zero FR adoption are also omitted.
22
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(Public Security) seems far more likely to pursue rulemaking than the People’s Bank of China. It is a
pattern, like the ranking in Table 1, that begs an explanation.

Figure 2: Ranking of Select Agencies by FR/IPD Ratio
0.12

FR/IPD

0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0

State IP Office
Radio,…
Justice
Transport
Public Security
Press&Publication
Customs
Tourism
Industry&Commerce
Work Safety
Commerce
Land and Resources
Forestry
State-owned Assets
CSRC
Railway
Quality Supervision
Water Resources
NDRC
Industry and IT
Agriculture
Health
Environment
HR & Social Security
Civil Affairs
Housing&Urban
PBOC
Food and Drug
Sports
CBRC
Foreign Exchange
Science&Technology
Culture
Finance
Tax Administration
Education
Survey&Geoinform…
Ocean Admin

0.02

3. Potential Explanations of the Diverse Approaches to Rule by Law
a. Policy Topic and Institutions of Enforcement
A clue to an explanation for (at least some of) the patterns in Figure 2 (and Table 1) is furnished
by a study of subnational lawmaking I carried out with a co-author.24 In that study, we gathered
comprehensive information for the period of 2000 to 2014 regarding the local statutes (LSs) enacted by
China’s 31 provinces and 49 of its cities that had lawmaking power before 2015, as well as the FRs and
IPDs issued by the People’s Governments in the same jurisdictions. We further classified all LSs, FRs, and
IPDs into 39 policy subjects. These subjects do not perfectly correspond to the assortment of line
agencies at the subnational levels,25 but there is a reasonable amount of overlap. After applying this
classification to over 184,000 policy instruments (!), we computed, for each governmental unit, policy
subject and type of policy instrument (LS, FR, or IPD), the proportion of that type of instrument devoted
to the subject. For each subject, we then computed (i) the excess of the proportion of LSs devoted to it
over the proportion of IPDs devoted to it in a given jurisdiction, and (ii) a similar excess of FRs over IPDs.
When both (i) and (ii) are positive for a subject, we take this as an indication that for the jurisdiction in
question, there is a preference (relative to other policy topics) to announce policy on the subject
through lawmaking. Conversely, when both (i) and (ii) are negative for a given subject, we take this as
indication of a relative preference for informal policy announcement.

24

Cui and Wan, supra note 13.
This was partly because at the subnational level, only the chief executive office (i.e. governors or mayors) can
enact FRs, while line agencies did not have their own power to make law, unlike national agencies. Thus we
needed to come up with our own classification.
25
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Certain consistent biases towards formal lawmaking or informal policy announcements in most
provinces and cities emerge from this analysis. Among the subjects for which informality seems to
dominate are (i) tax and public finance, and (ii) education. These correspond to three of the lowestranked ministries in Figure 2. Other subjects for which informality seems to dominate are economic
development, medical and healthcare, social security, and food and drugs regulation. By contrast, in
numerous policy areas, including transportation and public safety, a relative preference for lawmaking is
found in most provinces and cities. Other similar areas are regulation of markets, environmental
regulation, population and marriage, and construction and real estate. Figure 3 illustrates the patterns
for some of these subjects.
We proposed to explain these biases towards formality or informality in the following way. For
some subjects, there may be a strong need for the relevant policies to become public and common
knowledge. For instance, enforcement by government agents alone may not suffice for rules on public
safety, transportation, environmental protection, construction and real estate, or regulation of markets
generally. Parties outside of the government are crucial to monitoring compliance, but they must know
what the rules are to perform such monitoring. Arguably, therefore, these policy areas are inherently
“public facing”. The promulgation of policies in these spheres through formal procedures has the unique
ability to provide the publicity that the rules are likely to require, while IPDs, though much less costly to
promulgate, would not allow for similar benefits.
In contrast, in policy topics dominated by informality, we observe either of two institutional
arrangements. One is the presence of public ownership, as reflected in education and healthcare (and
therefore also drugs). The other is the involvement of bureaucratic internal coordination; policies to
promote economic development are a key example. Tax, public finance, and social security in China are
policy areas that combine features of both arrangements. In both settings, policies matter more to
bureaucrats and public employees than to the wide public; therefore broad social compliance is less of
an issue. Therefore, regardless of who adopts these rules—provinces or cities—informal
implementation carries no disadvantage.
The validity of these explanations, in my view, gains support from the ministerial patterns in
Table 1 and Figure 2. Surely it is striking that the subjects of tax, public finance, and education lend
themselves strongly to informal policy announcement consistently at the national, provincial, and city
levels, while lawmakers at all three levels show a relative preference for formality on the subjects of
transportation and public safety. It is worth noting that this explanation implies that whether the use of
law is necessary (or dispensable) depends on prior institutional choices. For instance, tax policy can be
public facing, if we assume that tax collection relies on taxpayers to learn what the law is and declare
their tax liabilities accordingly (subject to the threat of audits and penalties). That, precisely, is how we
tend to think about tax administration in many developed countries (tax compliance is rule-following par
excellence). In China, however, tax collection very much relies on the effort of frontline tax collectors to
coerce and cajole taxpayers, with the result that taxpayer knowledge of tax law is far less important.26
Conversely, one can imagine that if the transportation sector in China were (counterfactually) largely
state-owned, as schools and hospitals are, the need for lawmaking in promulgating transportation policy
would decrease substantially.

26

See Wei Cui, “Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance: A Transactional Cost Perspective,” University
of Toronto Law Journal 65(3) (2015): 186.
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b. Ministerial characteristics
Are there other ministerial characteristics, aside from policy area, that might explain the
quantities of FRs (and IPDs) they generate?27 The only independent variables I am able to gather data for
at the ministry level are the staff size, budgets (both proposed and actual), and the identities of ministry
or agency chiefs (for all years) for some ministries.28 Figure 4 visualizes the correlations of numbers of
FRs and of IPDs to the budget variables. The size of the ministry budget has no impact on FR output, and
once agency and year fixed effects are controlled for, similarly has no impact on the quantity of IPDs.29
Figure 5 shows that there is a raw positive correlation between staff size and both FR and IPD output,
and that this correlation remains even after controlling for average budget. It is quite likely, however, for
some other ministry characteristic to jointly explain staff size and the volumes of FRs and IPDs produced,
reducing the plausibility of any causal relationship.30
These results are not altogether surprising. Much Chinese government staffing is concentrated
at sub-provincial levels, and ministerial staff size often fails to reflect the jurisdictional scope of a
national agency.31 The nature of ministerial budgets is also not well understood. Both might be noisy
measures of agencies’ regulatory responsibility.

c. Politician Incentives
In both China and the U.S.,32 often the most well-known and closely observed aspect of
government agencies besides their policy announcements is their political leaders. In recent years,
political scientists studying China have offered a variety of evidence showing that China’s subnational
politicians are strongly motivated by certain implicit performance metrics and political career incentives.
None of the studies, however, examines ministerial-level political leaders. It is, of course, a good
question how the performance of ministry chiefs in China can be evaluated—virtually none of the
targets set for subnational politicians (e.g. GDP growth, social stability, birth control, etc.) is applicable
to national ministries. There are at least two possible answers. One is that ministers are evaluated on
the implementation of policies that hold priority for more senior politicians; these may be reflected in
ministerial policy announcements. The other is that policy implementation mostly occurs at the
subnational level and thus requires much coordination from subnational actors, such that it is difficult to
specify a ministerial-level outcome that would be appropriate for evaluation.

27

Analysis not shown here confirms that once agency and year fixed effects are controlled for, there is no
significant correlation between FRs and IPDs.
28
Data on staff size tends to be available only for one year per ministry, thus form only a cross section (with 39
observations). However, staffing level tended also to experience little change at the national ministries in the
period we cover. The budget data formed a panel with a maximum of 113 ministry-years. See Appendix Table A.1
for data availability by ministry.
29
Figure 4 uses data on proposed budgets. The results from closing budgets are similar.
30
Because we only have cross sectional data on staff size, we cannot control for year fixed effects.
31
The SAT, for example, has a staff of fewer than 800 but nominally supervises close to 800,000 tax administrators
across China, which represents more than 10% of the civil service. The Ministry of Environmental Protection
similarly hosts only 0.7% of the total staff employed by environmental protection agencies in China.
32
For a recent empirical study of U.S. federal government rulemaking, see Rachel Potter and Charles Shipan,
“Agency rulemaking in a separation of powers system,” Journal of Public Policy 39(1) (2019): 89.
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Figure 6 displays regressions where the dependent variable is the FR (or IPD) count of a ministry
in a given year, and the independent variable is the year-in-office of the minister, along with agency and
year fixed effects. Two different specifications (Poisson and negative binomial, both used to deal with
the low-count nature of the FR variable) are used. What we see is clearly a null result: except for a slight
loss in productivity for ministers occupying their offices for eight years or more, career progress has no
observed impact on FR or IPD production. This is consistent with the fact that (to my knowledge) making
regulations per se is not one of the performance metrics applied to political leaders in the executive
branch, and issuing IPDs is sufficiently low-cost to most bureaucrats that it could not possibly be used as
a performance metric.

4. The Calculus of Lawmaking
Studying patterns in and explanations for agency rulemaking behavior is challenging in any
context,33 but I believe it is crucially important in the Chinese setting, for the following reason. Chinese
government agencies do make law, but as Professor Howson’s CSRC example and so many other similar
examples demonstrate, they could just as easily—or, indeed, much more easily—not make law.
Commands directed at bureaucratic subordinates, including in the form of IPDs, prevail. Much recent
scholarship on Chinese law has endeavored to argue that authoritarianism may be consistent with “rule
by law”, even if it is in conflict with a stronger notion of “rule of law”.34 But the very infrequency with
which Chinese bureaucratic leaders resort to law shows that even if “rule by law” is consistent with
authoritarianism, it is far from the preferred approach to governance. To understand Chinese
governance today and in the foreseeable future, one must understand the autocrats’ alternatives to
law—alternatives that have not only survived 40 years of economic reform but have likely grown with
the economy.35
We can frame the issue in the following way. A minister of a national agency can choose among
several different paths for implementing new policies. He can propose to the Prime Minister that the
latter enact either statutes (through the National People’s Congress), administrative statutes (xingzheng
fagui), or some State Council informal directive. Or he can promulgate a formal regulation (if not
preempted by higher law), which also possesses formal legal effect and is binding on courts, without
elevating the issue politically. Alternatively, he can eschew formalities altogether, and implement policy
through issuing IPDs. It would seem which path he pursues should depend on their relative benefits and
costs. In particular, putting aside the options related to the State Council (outside the scope of this
study), what relative benefits and costs do FRs possess when compared with IPDs?
The attractions of IPDs seem overwhelming. Informal directives are much less costly to produce
in terms of both time and political resources, making them the perfect instruments for achieving shortterm policy objectives. They are also flexible, and can be easily revised to incorporate new information
and to correct mistakes in past policies. Moreover, they can be used to express the wills and preferences
of a few political actors without garnering the consensus of a broad array of stakeholders. Finally,
although IPDs may not command consensus among political actors, they are generally backed by the
33

For reviews of the (mixed) results in empirical analyses of federal rulemaking in the U.S., see Potter and Shipan,
supra note 32; John de Figueiredo, J. M., and E. Stiglitz, “Democratic Rulemaking,” in Oxford Handbook of Law and
Economics: Volume 3: Public Law and Legal Institutions, ed. Francesco Parisi (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017), chapter 3.
34
To some, this may seem like a platitude; to others, “rule by law” and “rule of law” are not so easily distinguished.
35
See the declining trend in rulemaking in Figure 1.
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coercive power of the state and few private actors will succeed in contesting them merely because they
lack formal legal effect. Even if IPDs cannot bind courts, this fact in itself is unlikely to undermine a
policy’s implementability in China.
In what circumstances, then, might a minister view a formal regulation as a superior path of for
the pursuit of policy? I propose four such reasons.
First, because of the existence of procedural rules, the adoption of a formal statute or regulation
is more time-consuming—and, by the same token, so is its repeal. That is, formal legal rules are
generally more permanent, whereas IPDs are easily reversed. The adoption of formal legal rules can thus
insulate policies from changes in political coalitions or configurations in special interest groups.
Second, the procedures for adopting formal legal rules also imply that there is a process for
achieving policy consensus and political coordination within the ministry. For example, if a single
ministry division is capable of implementing a policy without opposition from other division, it may be
sufficient for the division to sponsor its own IPDs. However, if coordination among multiple divisions is
necessary or desired, making formal legal rules is one important way of achieving such coordination.
Indeed, the relative permanence of formal legal rules ensures that such coordination can be relied on
and does not easily unravel.
Third, the higher legal status of formal legal rules may lead to greater compliance by
government actors (e.g. different government offices). This is the case not because of enforceability by
courts, but by virtue of bureaucratic and Party disciplinary rules. That is, formal legal norms can be used
by the superior or more powerful members of the political hierarchy to discipline subordinate or less
powerful members. The vulnerability of those who take actions in breach of the law comes not from the
threat of judicial repudiation and any consequent undermining of the implementation of the policies,
but from political rivals who may highlight such a breach in political contests.
Fourth and finally, whereas the large quantities of informal agency announcements and their
most frequent use in managing mundane government activities ensure that any given IPD is likely to
remain obscure to the public, formality provides the rules with prominence, legitimacy, and authority. It
is possible that ministerial political leaders have personal preferences for these “attributes of legality”,
but it is more likely that the functional role of these attributes in securing compliance exerts a steady,
even if not inexorable, pull on bureaucratic choices. This logic may be what is at play in the consistent
biases towards formality in certain policy areas discussed in Section 3.1.
It is surely an empirical challenge to find ways to ascertain the presence of any of these four
circumstances. My own intuition is that reasons two and three have infrequent application in the
ministry context. Different divisions within a ministry do not represent factions with firmly demarcated
turfs in the same way that different ministries or line agencies do, so the cost of ongoing inter-division
coordination is unlikely to justify investing in rulemaking. Moreover, if we think that the important
political rivalries occur across ministries instead of within, the formal regulation of one ministry is
unlikely to intimidate rivals in a different ministry. This leaves reasons one and four as the main
incentives for and benefits of ministry regulation-making.
These preliminary conjectures deserve further investigation, by both legal scholars and political
scientists. I close this chapter with a comment on one strand of recent political science scholarship on
China’s bureaucracy. There appears to be substantial interest in studying open policy consultations
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hosted by the executive branch entities. It is as though scholars are eager to extend their studies of
public deliberation in the parliamentary branch of government in China to the executive branch. I have
argued elsewhere against the fixation on parliamentary deliberation; in a parliamentary system firmly
controlled by one party, one would simply not expect much parliamentary deliberation even in a
democracy.36 Here, I would strongly caution against fixation on deliberation in the executive branch as
well. Public consultations are generally required for the making of ministry regulations,37 and as far as I
can tell, the public consultation processes pursued by national ministries and studied by scholars
predominantly involve regulation-making. That is, engagement in public consultation is entirely a
parasitic epiphenomenon of the decision to engage in formal rulemaking. Thus, any study purporting to
address the question of when (and which) Chinese ministries pursue public consultations must
necessarily yield to the study of the more fundamental question posed in this chapter: When do Chinese
national ministries make law?

36

Wei Cui and Jiang Wan, “Decentralizing Legislation in China’s Law on Legislation Amendment,” Hong Kong Law
Journal 49(2) (2019).
37
Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules (规章制定程序条例) (Promulgated by the State Council
on November 16, 2001; revised on December 22, 2017), Article 15.
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Table 1: National Ministries’ Formal Regulations and Released IPDs (2000-2014)
Ministry

FR annual
mean
15
13
12

IPD annual
mean
417
181
408

10
9
9
9
8
7
6

452
155
16
317
259
455
146

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
Ministry of Public Security
China Insurance Regulatory Commission
National Health Commission
State Administration for Industry and Commerce
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Environmental Protection
China Banking Regulatory Commission

6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5

217
82
791
236
116
62
256
428

State Administration of Radio, Film and Television

4

52

Ministry of Finance
State Intellectual Property Office
General Administration of Press and Publication
Ministry of Land and Resources

4
4
4
4

617
35
57
105

Ministry of Commerce
Ministry of Transport
General Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection and Quarantine
Ministry of Agriculture
General Administration of Customs
Civil Aviation Administration of China
National Development and Reform Commission
China Securities Regulatory Commission
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development
State Administration of Work Safety

Data source: Chinalawinfo, IPD information gathered in December 2015.

Ministry
Human Resources and Social Security
People's Bank of China
Ministry of Culture
State Taxation Administration
State Food and Drug Administration
State Forestry Administration
Ministry of Water Resources
Ministry of Civil Affairs
National Railway Administration
State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission
National Tourism Bureau
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Supervision
General Administration of Sport
Ministry of Science and Technology
National Bureau of Statistics
National Audit Office
State Administration of Foreign
Exchange
National Administration of Surveying,
Mapping and Geoinformation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
State Oceanic Administration
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of State Security
Average across ministries

FR annual
mean
3
3
2

IPD annual
mean
189
224
320

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

347
190
69
76
117
64
59

2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1

40
474
11
78
91
17
24
67

0

68

0
0
0
0
4

7
29
0
1
183

Figure 3: Province and city (ordered by formality dominance at the province level)
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City level. 49 cases, with 13 negatives ( 26.53% ) and 16 positives ( 32.65% ).

Province level. 31 cases, with 2 negatives ( 6.45% ) and 21 positives ( 67.74% ).
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Province level. 31 cases, with 20 negatives ( 64.52% ) and 2 positives ( 6.45% ).

Province level. 31 cases, with 16 negatives ( 51.61% ) and 1 positives ( 3.23% ).
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Figure 4: Correlation between Agency Budget and FR and IPD output
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Figure 5: Correlation between Agency Staff Size and FR and IPD output
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Figure 6: Minister career analysis
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Dots indicate the predicted number of events for each year of tenure, while the range plot with the capped spikes shows the
corresponding 95 CI. If the year of tenure is higher than 8, it is recoded to 8. Regressions include Ministry and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the Ministry level. When working with FR, ministries that report a total of 3 or less
instruments during the whole period of analysis are excluded.

Table A.1 List of National Ministries and Agencies and Independent Variable Coverage
中央部委名称

Name of National Ministry or Agency

农业部
民政部
商务部
文化部
教育部
环境保护部
财政部
外交部
住房和城乡建设部
人力资源和社会保障部
工业和信息化部
司法部
国土资源部
公安部
科学技术部
监察部
交通运输部
水利部
审计署
国家发展和改革委员会
国家卫生和计划生育委员会
中国人民银行
国家民族事务委员会
国务院办公厅
国防部
国家安全部
国家食品药品监督管理总局

Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Civil Affairs
Ministry of Commerce
Ministry of Culture
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Environmental Protection
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Land and Resources
Ministry of Public Security
Ministry of Science and Technology
Ministry of Supervision
Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Water Resources
National Audit Office
National Development and Reform Commission
National Health and Family Planning Commission
People’s Bank of China
State Ethnic Affairs Commission
General Office of the State Council
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of State Security
China Food and Drug Administration

海关总署
国家质量监督检验检疫总局

General Administration of Customs
General Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection and Quarantine

Category_
abb
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B

Career

Staffing

Closing Budget

2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
NA
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
NA
2000-2013
NA
NA
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013

2007-2013
2011-2013
2010-2013
2007-2013
2007-2013
2007-2013
2010-2013
2011-2012
2010-2012
2008-2009
2010-2013
2010-2013
2010-2013
2013
2007-2013
2013
2011
2010-2013
2007-2013
2011-2013
2011-2013
2013
2010-2013
NA
NA
NA
NA

B
B

2000-2013
2001-2013

2008
2008
2003
2008
2008
2008
2008
NA
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
NA
2008
NA
2009
2008
2008
2008
2013
2008
NA
2008
NA
NA
2003, 2008,
2013
2008
2008

NA
2010-2013

国家体育总局
国家统计局
国家旅游局
国家工商行政管理总局
国家新闻出版广电总局
国家税务总局
国家安全生产监督管理总局
国家林业局
国家知识产权局
国务院国有资产监督管理委员
会
中国银行业监督管理委员会
中国保险监督管理委员会
中国证券监督管理委员会
中国民用航空局
国家测绘局
铁道部 （国家铁路局)
国家外汇管理局
国家海洋局
国家能源局
国家文物局
国家煤矿安全监察局
国家外国专家局
国家粮食局
国家国防科技工业局
国家中医药管理局
国家公务员局
国家信访局
国家邮政局
国家烟草专卖局

General Administration of Sport
National Bureau of Statistics
National Tourism Administration
State Administration for Industry and Commerce
State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film
and Television
State Taxation Administration
State Administration of Work Safety
State Forestry Administration
State Intellectual Property Office
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission

B
B
B
B
B

2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
NA

2009
2008
2008
2008
2013

NA
NA
NA
2010-2013
NA

B
B
B
B
B

2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013

2008
2005, 2008
2008
2008
2003

2010-2013
NA
NA
NA
NA

China Banking Regulatory Commission
China Insurance Regulatory Commission
China Securities Regulatory Commission
Civil Aviation Administration of China
National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and
Geoinformation
National Railway Administration
State Administration of Foreign Exchange
State Oceanic Administration
National Energy Administration
State Administration of Cultural Heritage
State Administration of Coal Mine Safety
State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs
State Administration of Grain
State Administration of Science, Technology and
Industry for National Defense
State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine
State Bureau of Civil Servants
State Bureau for Letters and Calls
State Post Bureau
State Tobacco Monopoly Administration

C
C
C
D
D

2003-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013
2000-2013

2003
2003
NA
2009
2009

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

2000-2013
NA
2000-2013
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

2009, 2013
2009
2008, 2013
2013
NA
2005, 2008
2008
2009
NA

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

D
D
D
D
D

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

2009
2008
2009
2006, 2009
2008

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

